Of all the ways to speak of transcendence, the perception of objects as spatially and temporally transcendent to us would seem to be one of the more mundane. So allow me to make the case right at the start as to why understanding how Hans-Georg Gadamer explains our perceptual awareness of objects is interesting and relevant.

First, there is the general point that to fully appreciate Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics we need to take seriously its place within the phenomenological tradition; the nature of perception has been a central theme from the beginnings of phenomenology, and the nature of our awareness of objects as transcendent has been a central theme of the nature of perception. That things are experienced as irreducible to the way they are experienced—experienced as having being beyond their appearance—is our most common encounter with transcendence. When we think of transcendence as moving out from us or as going beyond something—that is, when we think of it as best captured through spatial metaphors—it is because we are drawing on this most familiar sense of transcendence, the transcendence of spatial-temporal objects. Gadamer inherits from classical phenomenology the view that perception is directly of the objects of perception; perception is not mediated through ideas or representations, rather “consciousness is,” as he puts it, “according to its own essential structure, already with objects.” Since there is disagreement among phenomenologists about how object perception should be best characterized, it is worth knowing where Gadamer stands on the issue; however, since he did not write anything extensive or detailed about the nature of perception, knowing where he stands will take some interpretive reconstruction.

Second, Hubert Dreyfus has joined a debate around John McDowell’s denial of the possibility of a non-conceptual awareness of objects. Two things make this debate relevant to Gadamerians. First, McDowell appeals to Gadamer to help respond to a pressing concern with his view. If we start from McDowell’s view that human perception is the actualization of conceptual capacities, how can we explain the continuities between the way mature humans perceive the world and the way beings that lack those conceptual capacities, such as infants or non-human animals, perceive the world? McDowell relies on Gadamer’s distinction between an environment and a world: animals exist in an environment, driven by solving problems related to their biological imperatives; humans live in a world toward which we are conceptually oriented to allow for reflection and action in ways not simply reducible to biological imperatives. Dreyfus thinks that McDowell under-appreciates the resources the phenomenological tradition provides for a richer understanding of the meaningfulness of embodied, skillfully coping, non-conceptual actions. He argues that Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty provide the tools for understanding the origins and the nature of the perceptual transcendence of objects. Separately, Dreyfus has criticized Gadamer for not taking “a stand on Heidegger’s claim that there is a level of everyday practice (the Vorhabe) beneath our theoretical presuppositions and assumptions (the Vorsicht),” and this objection connects to his objection against McDowell. So Gadamer has been drafted into the debate on the side of the Sellarsian McDowell, while Dreyfus presents his response as phenomenology’s response to McDowell. By laying out Gadamer’s actual views about the way we are aware of objects as transcendent, we can better position him with respect to the issues at stake between Dreyfus and McDowell on the possibility of non-conceptual perception.

The general question I want to address is this: How does Gadamer articulate object transcendence? The four key claims that he makes are: (1) that the body is first and foremost an opening to the world and is incapable of being fully objectified; (2) that the way the world is
disclosed spatially according to our bodies parallels the way the world is disclosed conceptually through language; (3) that the bodily disclosure of objects is not prior (temporally or logically) to the linguistic disclosure of objects; and (4) that there is in the perception of objects a double transcendence, a spatial-temporal transcendence that reveals the object as surpassing any particular appearance of it, and a linguistic/conceptual transcendence revealing it as not just an individual object, but an object disclosable through language, and, as such, conceptually relatable to other objects.

Dreyfus’s Objection to Gadamer’s Inheritance of Heidegger

Let’s begin by considering Dreyfus’s argument against Gadamer. Here is the key quotation:

Much of the confusion concerning hermeneutics in the current literature stems from the fact that Gadamer, who claims to be working out the implications of Heidegger’s notion of hermeneutics, never seems to have taken a stand on Heidegger’s claim that there is a level of everyday practice (the Vorhaben) beneath our theoretical presuppositions and assumptions (the Vorsicht). Gadamer often employs the right rhetoric...but at times he seems to side with the cognitivists like Quine. In describing the hermeneutic pre-understanding, instead of speaking of Vorhaben, he speaks of Vorurteil (prejudice or pre-judgment) which seems for him to be an implicit belief or assumption.6

The objection is that Gadamer claims to accept what Heidegger calls the fore-structure of interpretation: fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception.7 He seems, however, to pass over Heidegger’s account of fore-having—the idea that all interpretations are grounded in a pre-theoretical, practical awareness of the subject matter of the interpretation—instead focusing on the tacit, unarticulated beliefs that shape our interpretations. As such Gadamer emphasizes the cognitive background conditions for intelligible interpretations and overlooks the practical background conditions.

Dreyfus is correct that Gadamer stresses Vorurteilen over Vorhaben, but in part this is because when Gadamer discusses interpretation he is generally concerned with the interpretation of texts or works of art, and in those cases what is most significant is not our practical being-in-the-world, but our prejudices. Interpreting a text requires us to become clear about the ways that pre-reflective meanings are directing our judgments leading us to potentially flawed interpretations; it is less important to understand the way that our practical involvement in the world shapes our interpretation of the text. Still Gadamer does speak of the body and the way that objects are disclosed pre-theoretically through our bodily engagement with the world. His account is not nearly as developed as Edmund Husserl’s or Merleau-Ponty’s—and we might be right to criticize him on the grounds that his meager comments betray a lack of appreciation for the importance of the body; we can grant that to Dreyfus—but nevertheless he has views on the nature of the body and looking at them will give us a first glimpse into his account of object transcendence.

Gadamer on the Body

In the essay “Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Metaphysics,” Gadamer opens with Husserl’s basic distinction between our bodies as lived (Leib) and as our bodies as physical objects (Körper).

Husserl’s analyses concerning the kinaesthetic constitution of our bodily being are of exquisite subtlety. However does not the real mystery of our bodily being consist in this, that the actual being of the body is not an object of consciousness? One’s bodily actuality is not what one notices of one’s body. . . . It rather consists in our fully being-given-over to the “here” (Da), to what captivates us.8

Rather than speaking as Husserl does as two kinds of bodily awareness, Gadamer stresses that our body is primarily not what we are aware of, but that by which we are aware of our
world. Our primary awareness of our body is its function as making possible our “fully” being given over to the objects in our environment. Gadamer writes that “because the body presents itself as something with which we are intimate and not like an obstacle, it is precisely what sets us free and lets us be open for what is.” The awareness of the transcendence of objects occurs as a result of the functioning of our body in a world; the body itself only rarely becomes an object. In times of illness we become aware of our bodies as objects, but our bodies are never fully objectified. Certainly for Gadamer our bodies “cannot be approached through objectivization and treated as methodological objects” — it is the condition for any objectivization.

To help us arrive at a fuller understanding of Gadamer’s account of the body a telling discussion comes in Truth and Method when Gadamer is criticizing both Husserl and Wilhelm Dilthey for over intellectualizing our awareness of others as subjects. Both make the same mistake: “The other person is first apprehended as an object of perception which then, though empathy, becomes a ‘thou.’” Gadamer continues, “in Husserl the concept of empathy has a purely transcendental meaning no doubt, but it is still oriented to the interiority of self-consciousness and fails to orient itself toward the functional circle (Funktionskreis) of life, which goes far beyond consciousness, to which, however, it claims to return.” In a footnote Gadamer says by Funktionskreis he is referring to Viktor Weizsäcker’s concept of a Gestaltkreis, which is the idea that our bodily actions and our perceptions are seamlessly interconnected.

Weizsäcker’s links between action and perception are not just the obvious ones—for example, that our field of vision depends on the direction of our gaze—but, also, that those aspects of our perceptual field that are foregrounded are connected to the practical way our body functions in a setting. A doorway shows itself to our perception, for example, because we have the sorts of bodily habits that make doorways useful objects; a cup stands out in our perceptual field as affording us the opportunity to drink coffee. Because of our bodily comportment to the world, objects are disclosed in perception as useful. But likewise our actions are constantly monitored and guided by our perceptions. To successfully move through a doorway or drink from a cup of coffee involves an elaborate collaboration between our bodily actions and our perceptions. Actions and perceptions are united into an undifferentiated, organic whole such that it is impossible to interpret the event as causally directed from perception to action or action to perception—it is a single motor-sensory event.

As inspired by Weizsäcker, we can see that Gadamer’s view of our pre-thematic bodily awareness of the world is more sophisticated than Dreyfus makes it out to be. In addition, it provides us with the first way that objects are disclosed to us as transcendent. In what ways is the embodied awareness of objects as available or as affording opportunities an awareness of objects as transcendent? It is not clear that we are ever aware of these things as objects at all since most of our bodily comportment is sub-conscious. Here awareness is being taken too narrowly. Our practical engagement with the world has sight in Heidegger’s sense of letting beings that are accessible to be encountered; there is a practical awareness that can operate independently from conscious awareness. At the very least objects that afford us possibilities are disclosed as temporally independent of our perception of them. The door affords us the possibility of passage; implicit in that is the sense that the door will still afford that possibility when I arrive at it—that its existence and what it affords will remain as long as is necessary for me to complete the action. Moreover as it discloses a possibility, it is a possibility taken or not; as such it includes the sense that what it affords us is separate from whether we use it. Finally, by presenting us with an opportunity, the object is calling forth certain actions as being successful—the floor discloses itself to me as being available for walking on and therefore as furnishing part of what I need to walk successfully. The calling forth of an action on the basis of assuring its success is a temporal event that contains in its sense that the object disclosed preexisted the action or the thought to act, for were we not called forth we would not have acted. Therefore the object is disclosed in perception as temporally and spatially transcendent.

One more comparison might help. Consider an object that is so integrated into the
well-functioning of our body that it doesn’t disclose itself as an object for use, for example an artificial limb. While it certainly makes sense to say that an artificial limb affords us opportunities we would not have had without it, there is still a difference between the way an object shows itself for our use and the way that an artificial limb discloses the elements of the world for our use. We rightly say the cup affords us the possibility of picking it up and drinking coffee, but we wouldn’t say that our opposable thumbs, or our free shoulder joints, or our esophagus affords us the opportunity of drinking coffee, and this is not just because we have opposable thumbs and an esophagus even when there is no coffee around. It is because for the most part we do not stand in a use relationship to our bodies. Our body, including an artificial limb, is the openness to the world that allows things to show themselves to us as available to use. It is the condition that leads to the certain features of our perceptual field to stand out for use, rather than that which stands out; our body rarely reveals itself in its revealing objects. And included in the way such objects stand out, is as separate from our body and as available to it, but not of it—which is to say, the object stands out as independent from us.

There is another reason for thinking that what is disclosed as affording practical possibilities is disclosed as having spatial-temporal objectivity. When there is a breakdown in our normal course of behavior, we can step back and investigate the object to see what kind of object it is and why what should have been normal behavior has failed. In the process we objectify the object and reflect on it—this is a common example of the way theoretical interest arises out of practical engagement. However, the stepping back cannot be what establishes the object as transcendent since it itself is a kind of motor-perceptual behavior directed toward an object recognized as transcendent. We err if we think that stepping back from the object is a break from our motor-perceptual relation to the object; in fact it is a modification of that relation, one that discloses the relevant features of the situation to our perception. This motor-sensory modification is not haphazard; it is guided by a prior awareness of the object as a tool for use, that is, as transcendent in some sense. Otherwise we would not know what to step back from. So there is already an awareness of the transcendence of the object prior to its objectification through reflective investigation—a transcendence revealed by our practical engagement in the world as a living being. Of course the objectification provides for another degree of transcendence; it discloses the object as having properties that cause its usefulness, but exist independently of our use.

In a late article dedicated to Weizsäcker Gadamer connects the *Gestaltkreis*, the “ongoing interplay between perception and movement,” to the Greek concepts of *krienein*, “the ability to discriminate,” and *kinein*, “the power of movement.” These, he says, are what distinguish living creatures from inanimate objects. Humans, Gadamer claims, have the additional power to be able to step back and to consider new possibilities creating a fundamental difference between the way that humans and non-human animals interact in their environment. We share with non-human animals the awareness of object transcendence that arises out of our motor-sensory involvement in the world; but there is a further kind of awareness of object transcendence that is unique to humans. To see how these two forms of object transcendence are related it will help to look at how Gadamer’s views function in McDowell’s theory of perception.

**McDowell’s Use of Gadamer**

McDowell’s discussion of Gadamer in *Mind and World* arises in response to a potential objection to his view. McDowell argues that for perception to function to justify beliefs, it must be informed by concepts, or, more accurately, be informed by the conceptual capacity to locate the content of the perception in the space of reasons. This, however, is a fairly high conceptual capacity and one only few are willing to grant to non-human animals, and then to only few non-human animals. Our sense is that at some brute level humans and animals perceive the world in the same way—when my cat and I look at his empty food bowl there may be many things going on in my mind not going on in his, yet still it seems our perceptions correspond at some level. If this is so, though, then human perception isn’t conceptual through and through. To alleviate this
problem, McDowell draws on Gadamer’s distinction between a world and an environment, a distinction Gadamer claims comes from Max Scheler. As McDowell presents it, the life of non-human animals “is structured exclusively by immediate biological imperatives. . . . A mere animal does not weigh reasons . . . [therefore] the milieu it lives in can be no more than a succession of problems and opportunities, constituted as such by those biological imperatives.” Animals react and respond to stimuli in their environment, and the stimuli provide reasons for their actions, but they never respond to them as reasons, only as stimuli. Non-human animals are by no means automatons since they need to have a developed perceptual sensitivity to their environment, an ability to anticipate of pain and pleasure, and since some biological imperatives are quite sophisticated; they have, in McDowell’s words, “quasi-subjectivity,” yet they are, in Gadamer’s words, “embedded in their environment.” Of course this is in contrast to human beings, who have full subjectivity. Humans, since they are able to reason about their course of action can conceptualize their situation and establish an orientation towards it that is not limited by the pressures of their immediate biological imperatives. This orientation is the defining feature of inhabiting a world rather than an environment. Scheler writes,

The spiritual [human] being, then, is no longer subject to its drives and environment. Instead it is “free from its environment” or, as we shall say, “open to the world.” Such a being has a “world.” . . . The essential characteristic of the spiritual being, regardless of its psychological makeup, is its existential liberation from the organic world—its freedom and detachability from the bondage and pressure of life, from its dependence upon all that belongs to life, including its own drive-motivated intelligence.

Even though the same objects might pass through mine and my cat’s fields of vision—such as the empty cat food bowl—I see the object as belonging to a world with an orientation according to which I can discriminate features and recognize new possibilities; the cat simply responds to seeing the object in its environment according to its place in its biological imperatives. Gadamer’s distinction between an environment and a world allows McDowell to hold onto his claim that human perception is fundamentally different from animal perception, while still explaining why we expect similarities. Following from this division between having a world and having an environment is the conclusion that humans, and not non-human animals, perceive their surroundings with a kind of objectivity that allows it to be thematizable. That is, a human being with full subjectivity experiences the world as available to reasoned reflection and as suitable as evidence for empirical beliefs.

A key question is whether the orientation which shapes a world piggy-backs on the environment, so that the conceptual elements don’t permeate perception all the way down, but just supplement them; or whether belonging to a world transforms even those interactions we might otherwise call environmental. Scheler certainly thinks the latter; being human changes everything. He writes,

It would also be a mistake to think that the new element that gives man his unique characteristic is nothing but an new essential form being added to the previous stages of psychic life.

The new principle transcends what we call life in its most general sense. It is not a stage of life, especially not a stage of the particular mode of life called psyche, but a principle opposed to life as such, even to life in man.

By saying it is opposed to life Scheler means that it has the power to interrupt what would otherwise be instinctual and habitual interactions with an environment. McDowell agrees with Scheler that our conceptual capacities shape our perceptions all the way down. The question for us is whether Gadamer capacities shape our perceptions all the way down. The question for us is whether Gadamer believes that our human worldly existence wholly transforms our animal, environmental existence, or simply supplements it. To answer that we will have to turn to his account of language.
Linguisticality and Factualness

As McDowell acknowledges, Gadamer’s discussion of the difference between a world and an environment occurs in the context of investigating our essentially linguistic being-in-the-world. Gadamer writes,

Not only is the world world only insofar as it comes into language, but language, too, has its real being only in the fact that the world is presented in it. Thus, that language is originarily human means at the same time that man’s being-in-the-world is primordially linguistic.24

If the being-in-the-world of human beings is not just essentially linguistic, but primordially linguistic, then this suggests that our linguisticality transforms our otherwise pre-linguistic, unreflective, skillful comportment with the world. Yet, Gadamer also writes that the fundamental linguisticality of understanding cannot mean that all experiencing of the world can only take place as and in language, for we know all too well those prelinguistic and metalinguistic inner awarenesses, those moments of dumbfoundedness and speaking silences in which our immediate contact with the world is taking place. And who would deny that there are real factors conditioning human life, such as hunger, love, labor, and domination, which are not themselves language or speaking, but which for their part furnish the space within which our speaking to each other and listening to each other can take place. This fact cannot be disputed.25

Here—in contrast to the claim that our being-in-the-world is primordially linguistic—Gadamer explicitly acknowledges the existence of a prelinguistic awareness. We can harmonize these seemingly contradictory views by looking more closely at what Gadamer means by linguisticality and by how it functions in Gadamer’s phenomenology of perception as a substitute for an account of subjectivity.

Gadamer appeals to Aristotle as a forerunner of his account of linguisticality. Two of Aristotle’s statements about human nature are “All men by nature seek to understand” and “humans are zoon logon echon.” If we, like Heidegger, translate “logon” as language, then it belongs to human nature to use language for understanding. As it belongs to our nature to seek with others articulate understanding of the world, it belongs to the way the world is disclosed to us that it is always already a subject matter of possible articulate understanding. That is to say, when we experience anything we experience it as something to understand by putting into words; objects are disclosed to us not only spatial-temporally for our use, but as linguistically available.

To appreciate the significance of this view let’s contrast it with an example put forward by Charles Taylor. Taylor is seeking to illustrate the relation between our non-linguistic experiences of the world and our linguistically guided reflections on our experiences.

Living with things involves a certain kind of understanding (which we might call ‘pre-understanding’). This is, things figure for us in their meaning or relevance for our purposes, desires, activities. As I navigate my way along the path of a hill, my mind totally absorbed anticipating the difficult conversation I’m going to have at my destination, I treat the different features of the terrain as obstacles, supports, openings, invitations to tread more warily, or run freely, etc. Even when I’m not thinking of them these things have those relevances for me; I know my way about among them.

This is non-conceptual; or to put it another way, language isn’t playing any direct role. Through language we humans have the capacity to focus on things, to pick out an X as an X. . . . At some point because of some breakdown, or just through intrinsic interest, I may come to focus on some aspects of this navigational know-how. I may begin to classify things as ‘obstacles’ or ‘facilitations’ and this will change the way I live in the world. But in all sorts of
ways, I live in the world and deal with it, without having done this. Ordinary coping isn’t conceptual.26

On the picture presented by Taylor, when there is a disruption in our normal activities our attention is drawn to the disruption and our facility with language lets us identify the problem, resolve it, and reestablish normal actions. But the relationship to language put forward by Taylor in this example is not Gadamer’s. It suggests there could be an orientation to a world that is non-linguistic, yet Gadamer is clear that linguisticity is a necessary condition for having a world. It is not, as Taylor suggests, that we have two ways of approaching the world, non-linguistically and linguistically, but that the world is disclosed to us always already as linguistically available. Gadamer is right that we don’t experience the world as language or in language—we don’t experience the world as if with subtitles, and we do experience things we lack words for; but we experience the world as language-able, as being able to be put into language. Linguistically relating to the world is not just one of many ways of relating to the world, even in what Taylor calls non-conceptual coping with the world, the world is being disclosed to us as analyzable through language. Here’s what Gadamer has to say about the matter:

Language is not one of the means by which consciousness is mediated with the world. . . . Language is by no means an instrument, a tool. For it is in the nature of the tool that we master its use, which is to say we take it in hand and lay it aside when it has done its service. . . . Such an analogy is false because we never find ourselves as consciousness over against the world and, as it were, grasp after a tool of understanding in a wordless condition. Rather, in all our knowledge of ourselves and in all knowledge of the world, we are always encompassed by the language that is our own.27

“We never find ourselves as consciousness over against the world and, as it were, grasp after a tool of understanding in a wordless condition,” Gadamer tell us. That doesn’t mean there can’t be a pre-linguistic, “immediate contact with the world;” it means that every pre-linguistic experience is always already potentially linguistic.28

To bring together the two parts of this essay—the part on the body and the part on linguisticity—recall the comment I made earlier that it makes sense to talk about coffee cups affording us the opportunity to drink coffee, but not opposable thumbs. Language parallels not the cups, but the opposable thumbs. It is not only something useful we call upon when needed, but the way in which certain things disclose themselves as capable of being articulately understood and communicated. In Charles Taylor’s example, there is a breakdown—an obstacle in our path is too large to go unnoticed—and we turn to language to help us conceptualize the problem and find a solution. This turn to language is not just because language is a particularly useful tool for problem solving, but because it belongs to the nature of the perception of the obstacle that language can disclose things about it, things that might be of use to us. That language can be applied to something belongs to the very perception of the things; this is why I want to say linguisticity functions as an account of subjectivity for Gadamer. Linguisticality puts the motivation for stepping back from engaged coping in the world within human nature rather than simply as a response to the need for problem solving.

Here we have arrived at a key conclusion: linguisticity provides a distinctive form of object transcendence. Objects are recognized not only as independently existing, but also as available to language, conceivable because of language, and communicable. To directly perceive objects as expressible in language shows that the objects are conceptually relatable to other objects in other times. It opens up a new kind of distance from the object and at the same time a new kind of transcendence, for being able to disclose an object in speech releases us from being dependent on the sense immediacy of the object. We can describe, articulate communicate and disclose the object to ourselves and to others in virtue of the object’s affordability to language.

In his discussion in Truth and Method of the difference between environment and world, Gadamer emphasizes this distinctive form of
transcendence; he calls it Sachlichkeit, factuality.

The relation of language to world follows its unique factuality (Sachlichkeit). That a thing behaves (eine Sache verhalt sich) in various ways permits one to recognize its independent otherness, which presupposes a real distance between the speaker and the thing. That something can foreground itself as a genuine matter of fact and become the content of an assertion that others can understand depends on this distance.

At this point Gadamer provides us with an account of object transcendence that is different from spatial-temporal independence. The object is transcendent in virtue of its ability to become “the content of an assertion,” that is, its ability to be disclosed to others through the application of concepts in language. Thus perception discloses objects to us with a two-fold transcendence, spatial-temporal transcendence and ideality. We’ve hit upon a standard view in phenomenology, that categorical intuition belongs to perception, though we’ve arrives at that point via a distinctively Gadamerian route: the account of linguisticality.

So in addition to the object transcendence that is given through the presentation of affordances, we have the object transcendence that is given through essential and primordial linguistic being-in-the-world. The linguistic element of experience is not derivable from our practical engagement in the world, and it presents language as a suitable means for disclosing those features of an environment that need to be consciously perceived in order to facilitate skilful coping. Let me immediately add that neither forms of transcendence are cases of the objectifying consciousness found in the sciences. In Truth and Method Gadamer differentiates factuality from objectivity—“the distance involved in a linguistic relationship to the world does not, as such, produce the objectivity that the natural sciences achieve.”

In the essay “The Problem of Intelligence” he puts the same point a little differently. “The structure of reflection is not always bound up with the notion of objectification... Reflection, as the capacity to take up a certain distance towards oneself, is not the same as a relation of opposition to an object.” Thus for all the ways we have found objects are presented as transcendent in perception, there is yet another kind of objectivity found in the natural sciences.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion let me return to the four points I mentioned at the start as key to Gadamer’s account of our perception of the transcendence of objects. The four key claims that he makes are: (1) that the body is first and foremost an opening to the world and is incapable of being fully objectified; (2) that the way the world is disclosed spatially according to our bodies parallels the way the world is disclosed conceptually through language; (3) that the bodily disclosure of objects is not prior (temporally or logically) to the linguistic disclosure of objects; and (4) that there is in the perception of objects a double transcendence, a spatial-temporal transcendence that reveals the object as surpassing any particular appearance of it, and a linguistic/conceptual transcendence revealing it as not just an individual object, but an object disclosable though language, thus as a kind of an object and thus related to other objects and other kinds of objects. How does this connect to Dreyfus’s objections of Gadamer (and McDowell)? First Gadamer’s understanding of embodied being in the world is much more sophisticated than Dreyfus accounts for. Second, since linguisticality transforms the way the world is disclosed to us as embodied practical beings, Gadamer’s view is closer to McDowell’s than Dreyfus’s. Third, Gadamer differs from McDowell in his theory of linguisticality and his differentiation between factuality and objectivization. Fourth, these differences support Gadamer’s prioritization of Vorurteilen over Vorhaben. Therefore, fifth, although we have a clearer picture of Gadamer’s views, it is not clear that in the end he is less susceptible to Dreyfus’s criticisms. To close with an apt quote from Hegel: “Logic permeates every relationship of man to nature, his sensation, intuition, desire, need, instinct and simply by so doing transforms it into something human.”

Gadamer will say the same thing, substituting language for logic. Language permeates every

**OBJECT TRANSCENDENCE**

67
relationship of humans to nature and simply by so doing transforms it into a world.

ENDNOTES

12. Weizsäcker’s main text on this topic is Der Gestaltkreis: Theorie der Einheit von Wahrnehmen und Bewegen (Stuttgart: G. Thieme, 1947); it was translated into French by Michel Foucault as Le Cycle de la Structure (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1958). Gadamer knew Weizsäcker both from trying to bring him to Leipzig in 1944, when Gadamer was the rector there, and from the short time they spent together as colleagues in Heidelberg.
14. Gadamer credits Weizsäcker’s studies with showing how individuals become so absorbed in social actions that the action can not be properly characterized in terms of the intentions of one or the other participants—a central view of Gadamer’s account of dialogue.
16. Here I am setting aside the example of the appearance of an abstract object, such as a mathematical theorem or moral rule that shows itself as useful. Those have no spatial transcendence, not because they are spatially imminent, but because they are non-spatial.
18. By the time of Truth and Method this distinction had become commonplace. It can be found, for example, in Paul Tillich’s 1951 Systematic Theology.
22. In “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language,” Gadamer extends his distinction between an environment and a world to matters of intersubjectivity: animals are related to others as Mitsamt; humans are related to each other as Miteinander.
23. Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature, 37. Scheler argued that we are aware of the thingliness of things through their resistance to our actions; Gadamer accepts Heidegger’s rejection of that view in Being and Time, §43.


28. Pre-linguistic does not mean not-linguistic, just not yet linguistic.


30. Ibid., 453.
