Presented at the Twentieth
World Congress of Philosophy Boston, MA 1998
The Body as Anstoss in
SartreÕs Account of Constitution
Abstract
Of all the German
Idealists, Sartre refers the least to Fichte—so little in fact that there
have been long-standing suspicions that he wasnÕt even familiar with FichteÕs
writings. It is perhaps ironic,
then, that FichteÕs writings are as helpful as they are for clarifying SartreÕs
views — especially his views on subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Here I want to look closely at a key
concept in FichteÕs mature writings — the concept of the Anstoss, a
concept which has Dan Breazeale has called ÒFichteÕs original insight.Ó1 Fichte
introduces the Anstoss, or ÒcheckÓ, to explain why the I posits the world as it
does. In effect, the Anstoss is
the occasion of the facticity of the I.
I will show that this concept can be uniquely helpful in understanding,
of all things, the role the body plays in SartreÕs theory of
intersubjectivity. The importance
of SartreÕs account of the body for his theory of subjectivity and
intersubjectivity has been chronically under-appreciated by his interpreters;
this comparison is the beginning of an attempt to rectify that. In turn the concept of the Anstoss
provides a means for analyzing the necessary differences between any Sartrean
and Fichtean ethics based on their respective accounts of intersubjectivity.
The Body as Anstoss in
SartreÕs Account of Constitution
By David Vessey
Beloit College
Of
all the German Idealists, Sartre refers the least to Fichte—so little in
fact that there have been long-standing suspicions that he wasnÕt even familiar
with FichteÕs writings. It is
perhaps ironic, then, that FichteÕs writings are as helpful as they are for
clarifying SartreÕs views—especially his views on subjectivity and
intersubjectivity. Here I want to
look closely at a key concept in FichteÕs mature writings—the concept of
the Anstoss, a concept which has Dan Breazeale (implicitly against Dieter
Henrich) has called ÒFichteÕs original insight.Ó1 I believe, and I hope to show here, that this concept can be
uniquely helpful in understanding, of all things, the role the body plays in
SartreÕs theory of intersubjectivity.
The importance of SartreÕs account of the body for his theory of
subjectivity and intersubjectivity has been chronically under-appreciated by
his interpreters; this comparison is the beginning of an attempt to rectify
that. This introduces in turn a
means for analyzing the necessary differences between any Sartrean and Fichtean
ethics based on their respective accounts of intersubjectivity.
The
term Anstoss is first used in a systematic fashion by Fichte in the Grundlage
der Gesamten Wissenschaftslehre from 1794/95.2 It appears near the end of the second part of the work where
Fichte is both presenting the culmination of his theory of representation and
laying the transition to the practical part of the Wissenschaftslehre. The
issue is the founding of the activity of representation: specifically, how can
one explain both the spontaneity of the I and the particular determination of
representations. Fichte has
recourse to one of the two first principles of his system—ÒThe I posits
itself absolutelyÓ and ÒA Not-I is unqualifiedly posited in opposition to the IÓ—for
the grounding the meaning of representation, but which one? Is representation an activity of the
self-positing I, or of the opposing Not-I? At stake here, of course, is the very structure and content
of FichteÕs idealism. If the
activity of representation is attributed solely to the subject then it is not
clear if Fichte can avoid either a transcendental solipsism, or a recourse to
the Kantian thing-in-itself (as Fichte calls it, Òthe wretched Ôthing-in-itselfÕÓ).
Both solutions are obviously unsatisfactory. Nor could Fichte ground the meaning of a representation in
the Not-I without, in the end, giving up idealism altogether—a truly
disastrous Òsolution.Ó Instead
Fichte arrives at the theory of Òthe mediacy of positing.Ó Fichte recognized that the content of
representation could be explained if a form of passivity could be introduced as
the source and the limit of purely active I. He claims that representation, although clearly in the end
founded in the activity of the I, is dependent for its content on the Anstoss—the
check on the infinite activity of the I which is both itself a posit of
consciousness and a condition for the possibility of the positing of
consciousness. The viability of
the solutions hangs with his ability to articulate the concept of the Anstoss—to
show how the I posits something which is still sufficiently external to its
activity of positing to provide the differentiation between subject and
object.
Consider
the following crucial quotation.
The objective element
[the Not-I] that is to be excluded [from the I] has no need at all to be
present; all that is needed, if I may so put it, is the presence of an Anstoss
for the I. That is to say, the subjective element must, for some reason that
simply lies outside of the activity of the I, be unable to extend any
further. Such an impossibility of
further extension would then constitute the indicated mere interplay or
meshing; such an Anstoss would not limit the I as active, but would give it the
task of limiting itself. All
limitation, however occurs through opposition, and thus simply in order to be
able to satisfy this task, the I would have to oppose something objective to
the subjective element that is to be limited and would then have to unite both
synthetically, in the manner just indicated. And thus the entire representation could be derived in this
way. . . . What [this explanation]
assumes is not a not-I that is present outside of the I, and not even a
determination that is present within the I, but rather the mere task, on the
part of the I itself, of undertaking a determination within itself—that
is, the mere determinability of the I.3
We can see two
fundamental claims being made here about the Anstoss. The first claim is
that Anstoss is not itself the
not-I, but is in some sense a product of the I. Fichte says that the
Anstoss does not check the I Òfrom the outsideÓ, it does not limit the I
as active, but gives it the ÒtaskÓ of limiting itself. At some places Fichte refers to the
Anstoss as a feeling—something which is clearly ours and could not exist
without us, but something which is not our doing.4 The Anstoss is a passive event occurring within I thus
escaping the I's activity.
The Anstoss (unposited by
the positing I) occurs to the I insofar as it is active, and is thus only a
check insofar as there is activity in the I; its possibility is conditional
upon the I's activity: no activity of the I, no Anstoss. Conversely, the
activity of the I's own self-determining would be conditioned by the Anstoss:
no Anstoss, no self-determination. Moreover, no self-determination, nothing
objective.5
The
second point about the Anstoss is that itÕs primary function is to check the
positing I. The Anstoss is not a product of the active I, but it has its
essential character as a check only in virtue of the activity of the I. Consider an example Sartre
uses. A mountain is a limitation
on someoneÕs projects only if he/she has projects (for example, walking to a
point on the other side of the mountain) which are limited by the mountain. It
is only in virtue of a particular project that a mountain becomes a check. Otherwise itÕs just a mountain. Of course, the analogy between the
Anstoss and the mountain fails when we recall that the Anstoss is not an
external check, but an internal check; still we can understand how it could be
the case that the Anstoss is both dependent on the determining I and necessary
for the determinability of the I.
Essential
to its identity as a check, is that it is immediately responded to by the
I. In response to the check of the
Anstoss, the I posits a not-I as the necessary source of the check. The
Anstoss, as a limit on the spontaneity of the ego is the impetus, or to use a
word Fichte often uses for the Anstoss, a summons (Aufforderung) for the I to
posit something outside itself.6
The
form of the positing is determined through the fundamental drive for
self-identity which is equivalent to the drive for rationalization.7 This drive, operating pre-consciously
and pre-volitionally, takes two forms according to whether what are being
rationalized are representations or volitions. In the first case, all representations are ordered to
concepts of the mind. This is the
theoretical goal of humanity. In
the second case, when encountering other rational agents, the agents acts in
accordance with the first principle to strive to work together with others to
construct a community founded on reason.
That is, we are driven towards for knowledge and morality.
In
The Science of Rights Fichte adds to the practical, moral side of the Anstoss.
This requirement
[Aufforderung] to act is the content of the influence and its ultimate end is a
free causality of the rational being.
. . . To do this however, it must have first understood and comprehended
the requirement, and this previous cognition of it is taken into
consideration. Hence the posited
ground of the influence, or of the requirement addressed to the subject must at
least presuppose the possibility that the subject can understand and comprehend
it, for otherwise its requirement [Aufforderung] would have no end in view at
all.8
The Anstoss does not merely summon us to act, it
summons us to act for the end of acting freely. That is it presents the occasion for our fundamental drive
to self-identity to manifest itself in our actions, but moreover, to
consciously manifest itself in our actions. That means that the Anstoss summons us to be cognizant of the ends to which we are
called. But, Fichte asks, what
could summon us to form a conception of an end? Fichte claims it could only be another rational agent.
The ground [of the
Anstoss] must therefore necessarily [itself] have the conception of reason and
freedom and must therefore be itself a being capable of comprehension, that is,
an intelligence, and since this is not possible without freedom, it must be a
free and hence a rational being, and must be posited as such.9
In response to the
feeling of the Aufforderung—to the feeling summoning us to act freely, in
effect, our conscience—we must posit another rational being as the origin
of the summons. But recall, the
Anstoss is a condition for self-consciousness, therefore the posited existence
of other persons is a condition of self-consciousness (and their existence is
known with the certainty of self-consciousness).10 With the two fundamental features of FichteÕs account of the
Anstoss in mind—it is a product of the I and a summoning check, as well
as the connection between the Anstoss and intersubjectivity—letÕs turn to
SartreÕs account of the body to realize the parallels.11
Exactly
as Sartre divides subjectivity in its modes of being-for-itself and
being-for-others and has emphasized not confusing the two, Sartre also
distinguishes the body-for-itself from the body-for-others. The two ontological dimensions are ÒincommunicableÓ
and irreconcilable: Òeither it is a thing among other things [the body for
others], or it is that by which things are revealed to me [the body for itself]
. . ., it can not be both.Ó12
The instructive example Sartre gives is that when we put our hands
together one is always touching, the other always touched; never is there a Òdouble
sensation.Ó The first ontological
dimension of the body—the body for-itself Òby which things are revealedÓ
is what concerns us.
The
body-for-itself is our facticity.
Following Heidegger, Sartre claims the essential mode of being of humans
is only realized as being-there.13
The world is only for us to the extent we exist here and now, although
the fact that we are at this particular here and now (as well as the fact that
we are at all) is contingent. This
contingency of our oriented, spatio-temporal being-in-the world is our
facticity. The for-itself is
always attempting to surpass its contingency through its projects in a futile attempt
to justify itself absolutely.
Notice the parallel: both Fichte and Sartre present the subject as
striving to separate itself from the Not-I (the In-Itself) in an attempt to
become free. In Sartre, the negation of the facticity in the striving for
transcendence is the concrete determination of the for-itself. The body, then, as Sartre writes,
is nothing other than the
For-itself, it is not an In-itself in the For-itself, for in that case it would
solidify everything. But it is the
fact that the For-itself is not its own foundation. . . . As such
the body is not distinct from the situation of the For-itself since for the
For-itself to exist and to be situated are one and the same.14
Like FichteÕs Anstoss,
the body belongs to the I (the For-Itself), not the Not-I (the In-Itself). In addition Sartre says that the body
is the immediate presence
to the For-itself of ÒsensibleÓ things in so far as this presence indicates a
center of reference and is already surpassed either toward the appearance of a
new this or toward a new combination of instrumental-things. . . . This means that it is at once a
point of view and a point of departure—a point of view, a point of
departure which I am and which at the same time I surpass towards what I have
to be.15
The body, for Sartre,
plays the same role with respect to consciousness as the Anstoss did for
Fichte: that necessity which summons and checks our conscious positing. Moreover as our past and as our point
of view, Sartre says that the body is the locus of the sedimentation of our
past experiences all the way back to our birth.16 Our body is that which we are before our subjectivity makes
us what we are; it is our past and our world. Much like the Anstoss, then, the body opens us to the would ÒsummoningÓ
our reply and in the process ÒchecksÓ and limits our possibilities. And the limiting, in the final
analysis, is not of our doing.
Consider what Sartre says in the following passage.
And we must understand it
in the two senses of the word Òlimit.Ó
On the side of the limiting, indeed, the limit is apprehended as the
container which contains me and surrounds me, the shell of emptiness which
pleads for me as a totality while putting me out of play; on the side of the
limited, it is wholly a phenomenon of selfness and is as the mathematical limit
is to the infinite series which progresses towards it without ever reaching
it.17
Clearly the twofold
nature of ÒlimitÓ is precisely the twofold nature of FichteÕs Anstoss: it is that which checks the infinite
activity of consciousness yet which remains an infinite goal of appropriation
for the end of justifying itself.
However, Sartre thinks that only a consciousness can check
consciousness.18
Here SartreÕs account of
intersubjectivity enters the narrative.
That our body is in the midst of the world is a result of our being-seen
by others. Our body in itself is
present to us as something to surpass on the basis of it being for-others. The other, then, brings about the body
as the mediator (which is surpassed) between subjectivity and the world and
establishes the condition for the possibility of any and all determination of
the for-itself. From the fact that we are a body in the mode of
being-for-others we can recognize what Sartre calls Òthe third ontological
dimension of the bodyÓ, namely that our body has an outside which escapes
us. We can attempt to recapture
our alienated ÒoutsideÓ through either embracing our facticity, giving up our
attempts at transcendence and resigning ourselves. To overcome our finitude means confronting the other in
his/her subjectivity. This is the
basis of SartreÕs Òethics.Ó19
Since it is through the gaze of the Other that we are embodied, the
attempt to regain our freedom and ground ourselves (through making the
contingencies of our own body the result of our own constitution) requires that
we force the others to recognize us on our own terms. This battle between subjects for recognition is the
fundamental defining feature of SartreÕs theory of intersubjectivity. We attempt to determine ourselves
against the OtherÕs gaze through articulating ourselves to the Other in an
attempt to reach consensus about ourselves. We express our transcendence by
trying to flee our facticity by expressing our subjectivity, thereby trying to
manipulate the Other into returning ourselves to ourselves.
Let
us conclude by noting some of the differences between the views. First, since in SartreÕs account the
not-I is the stimulus to conscious activity he does not need to distinguish (as
Fichte did) the Anstoss from the not-I.
Fichte needed to find some ground within the ego which motivates the ego
to posit itself absolutely; Sartre does not need to find the ground within the
ego. In fact, it is essential to
his view that the ground be independent of the ego. The passivity which
constitutes the Anstoss is part of the I (in Fichte); in Sartre it is the
origin of alienation. Second, SartreÕs externalization of the Anstoss puts
consciousness in the world from the start. As such, our facticity can become our fundamental
limitation. Thus it is possible on
SartreÕs, and not FichteÕs, account to understand the role of the historicity
of the ego in the constitution of the world. Fichte, on the contrary, must
place the ego outside of the world and then use the ego itself as the source of
its own limitation. Third, in
Sartre it is precisely the being-seen by the other which establishes ourselves
as being in the midst of the world—that is to say, establishes our body
as our facticity which must be surpassed by the for-itself. The intersubjective relationship
operates through the body as a condition for the determination of
consciousness. In Fichte, the summons to rationality which is the character of
the Anstoss points to the necessary existence of other rational subjects. Finally, Fichtean consciousness posits
the not-I, and then infers to its own free existence on the basis of the
recognition of the other I while Sartrean consciousness negates the not-I and
then posits itself in this negation. FichteÕs relation to the other is
fundamentally one of identification; SartreÕs of differentiation. Analogously,
FichteÕs ethics is based on the relation of mutual recognition; SartreÕs ethics
is based on the attempt to force recognition. In spite of these differences, many of which can be
understood as effects of their different conceptions of freedom, it is clear a
structural similarity persists in FichteÕs and SartreÕs account of
constitution: the necessary presence of a passivity, be it the body or the
Anstoss, at the heart of subjectivity and intersubjectivity.
1 Anstoss has usually been translated as
check, but because of the complexity of the concept (as will become clear) I
will leave it untranslated. My
analysis of the centrality of the concept of the Anstoss is heavily influenced
by Dan Breazeale, ÒCheck or Checkmate? On the Finitude of the Fichtean SelfÓ in
Karl AmeriksÕs and Dieter SturmaÕs The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self
in Classical German Philosophy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995), hereafter ÒBreazeale.Ó
BreazealeÕs reference is to Dieter HenrichÕs classic article, ÒFichteÕs
Original Insight.Ó
2 Translated as Science
of Knowledge. Ed. and tr. Heath, Peter and John Lachs (New York: Appelton
Century Crofts, 1970).
3 Science of Knowledge,
pg. 188; translation from Breazeale, pg. 89-90.
4 For example: ÒHere is
the basis for all reality: Reality—whether of the I or the Not-I—is
possible for the I only through the relation of feeling to the I, as we have
now shown—something that is possible only through the relation of a
feeling, without the I being conscious or being able to be conscious, of its
own intuition of this feeling, and which therefore appears to be felt, is
believed.Ó (Quoted in Breazeale pg. 107)
5 Science of Knowledge,
pg. 191. The use of the terms ÔoutsideÕ
and ÔexternalÕ can be misleading here.
Either we could say that Fichte is not being careful or perhaps that
they should be interpreted in the sense of outside the conscious activity of
the ego.
6 ÒIn so far as the
described influence enters sensation, is felt, it is a limitation of the ego;
and the subject must have posited it as such; but there is no limitation
without a limiting. Hence the
subject, in positing that influence, must have posited at the same time
something outside of itself as the determining ground of that influence.ÓThe
Science of Rights. Tr. A. E. Krueger (London: Routledge, 1970), pg. 56
7 ÒThe highest principle
in manÓ is Ò[b]e always at one with yourself.Ó He continued, Òaccording to this principle he . . . seeks—not
directly from a clearly conceived determining principle, but from one
interwoven through his entire being and without any contribution of his free
will—to subjugate irrational nature so that everything will harmonize
with his reason.Ó(from ÒOn the Linguistic Capacity and the Origin of LanguageÓ
translated as an appendix to Jere SurberÕs Language and German Idealism: FichteÕs Linguistic Philosophy
(Humanities Press, 1995) pg. 209).
8 The Science of
Rights, pg. 57. B the time of the Science of Rights,
Fichte has begun using ÒAufforderungÓ rather than ÒAnstossÓ to focus on the ÒsummoningÓ
aspect more than the ÒcheckingÓ
aspect of the concept. Of course,
if we are discussing the determination of representation, we are concerned with
the limit, if we are discussing ethics, we are concerned with the summons to be
moral.
9 The Science of
Rights, pg. 57
10Thus the duly famous
passage, ÒMan becomes man only among men; and since he can only be man, and
would not be at all unless he were man, it follows that if man is to be at all,
there must be men. This is not an
arbitrary assumption, not an opinion based on past experience or on other
probability-reasons; but it is a truth to be strictly deduced from the
conception of man.Ó (The Science of Rights, pg. 60).
11 I find it interesting (and
illuminating) that FichteÕs social ontology does not fall prey to SartreÕs
criticisms of idealism, and realism.
Nor can FichteÕs view be assimilated to HegelÕs, HusserlÕs, or HeideggerÕs
views all of which fall under SartreÕs scrutiny.
12 Being and Nothingness,
pg. 402.
13 ÒFor human reality, to
be is to-be-there. . . . It is an
ontological necessity.Ó Being and Nothingness, pg. 407. About facticity, he writes that the
For-Itself Òis in so far as there is in it something which it is not the
foundation—its presence to the world. . . .This perpetually evanescent contingency of the
in-itself which, without ever allowing itself to be apprehended, haunts the
for-itself and reattaches itself to being-in-itself—this contingency is
what we shall call the facticity of the for-itself.Ó (Being and Nothingness,
pg. 128, 131. italics his)
14 Being and Nothingness,
pg. 408.
15 Being and Nothingness,
pp. 429-30
16 Being and Nothingness,
pp. 431-2
17 Being and Nothingness,
pg. 381
18 Immediately prior to
the above quotation Sartre writes: ÒBut this limit can neither come from me nor
be thought by me, for I can not limit myself; otherwise I would be a finite
totality. On the other hand, in
SpinozaÕs terms, thought can only be limited by thought. Consciousness can be limited only by my
consciousness.Ó
19 Though, depending on
the extent one draws on the later notebooks, SartreÕs ethics may move well
beyond this battle for recognition.
See Thomas C. AndersonÕs Sartre's Two Ethics; From Authenticity to
Integral Humanity (Open Court, 1993).