Gadamer and the Body Across Dialogical Contexts
David Vessey
(Published in Philosophy Today, Vol. 44 Supplement [2000], 70-77)
Recently,
especially in Gadamerian hermeneutics, dialogue has functioned as a
philosopherÕs stone. The theory of
dialogue informs phenomenology—Òin the exchange of words, the thing meant
becomes more and more presentÓ;[1] philosophy of mind—Òthinking is
the dialogue of the soul with itselfÓ;[2] philosophy of language—Òlanguage
has its true reality in dialogueÓ;[3] philosophical anthropology—(quoting
Hšlderlin) Òdialogue is what we areÓ;[4] history of philosophy—the
Òhermeneutical reorientation of dialectic (which had been developed by German
Idealism as the speculative method) toward the art of living dialogue . . .
represented a correction of the ideal of methodÓ;[5] and, naturally, the philosophy of
interpretation—Òtradition is
genuine partner in dialogue, and we belong to it, as does the I with the
Thou.Ó[6] Dialogue is so philosophically ubiquitous that
GadamerÕs claim that hermeneuticsÕ Òmodesty consists in the fact that for it
there is no higher principle than this: holding oneself open to the
conversationÓ[7] looks like false modesty. Given the weight put on the power of
dialogue, we need to look carefully at its nature to understand how (and if) dialogue
can perform all these philosophical functions. Is dialogue a univocal phenomenon? Or are their different kinds of dialogue, perhaps sharing
certain features but differing on others. Gadamer himself acknowledges that
although Òtradition is a genuine partner in dialogueÓ, Òa text does not speak
to us in the same way as does a Thou.Ó[8]
We need to understand the variety of forms dialogue can take, and the
consequences and limitations of each.
This paper is a small start to that larger project. I will concern myself here with
ÒdialoguesÓ with works of art. My
conclusion is that although philosophers recently have looked to dialogue as a
model for what occurs in the encounter with a work of art (as well as in the
encounter with a tradition or a text), because they have failed to appreciate
the role the body
plays in constituting the encounter, they have failed to sufficiently
distinguish the different forms of dialogue. Once one appropriately considers the role of the dialogical
body, one realizes there are important differences between dialogues with other
people and dialogues with works of art. Throughout the paper I will focus on
GadamerÕs theory of art and dialogue and, in the final part, I will evaluate
whether he has an account of the body that could Òflesh outÓ his account of
dialogue. I conclude that he
might, but it is not explicit in his writings; still, it may be implicit in his
differentiation between what occurs in the presence of static works of arts,
and what occurs in the festival-like event of theater.
The
first part of the paper addresses the applicability of the model of dialogue to
the encounter with works of art. There are two main features that facilitate
this analogy. First, in dialogue
subjectivity is displaced. One enters into dialogue, but one does not control
the progression of the dialogue. A genuine dialogue is a genuinely social
act—it is irreducible to explanation in terms of one personÕs
activity. Dialogue is a form of
play, and in play Òthe real subject of the game is not the players, but the
game itself.Ó[9]
Gadamer claims that the give and take of dialogue operates on the model
of question and answer. We are always interpreting the content of an exchange
as a viable answer to a legitimate question. This turn raises new questions
requiring new answers. Just as the question and the answer belong together, so
do the exchanges of interlocutors.
Still, it would seem that such a model would not apply to works of art,
for the ÒinterlocutorÓ in this case is an inert object.
But how it is with
artwork, and especially with the linguistic work of art? How can one speak here of a dialogical
structure of understanding? The author is not present as an answering partner,
nor is there an issue to be discussed as to whether it is this way or that.
Rather, the text, the artwork, stands in itself. Here the dialectical exchange
of question and answer, insofar as it takes place at all, would seem to move
only in one direction, that is, from the one who seeks to understand the
artwork . . . [However] the
dialectic of question and answer does not here come to a stop. . . .
Apprehending a poetic work, whether it comes to us through the real ear or only
through a reader listening with an inner ear, presents itself basically as a
circular movement in which answers strike back as questions and provoke new
answers.[10]
In the context
of art as well as dialogue, Gadamer emphasizes the role of play in the
experience of works of art. To avoid the subjectification of aesthetic
judgment, Gadamer argues that the event of the aesthetic experience occurs in
the exchange between the viewer and the work—not simply in the viewer and
not simply in the work. This play, which manifests all the elements of play
tied to the displacement of subjectivity, is the being of art. Art plays, but
playing requires players and the play of art only occurs in the presence of a
spectator. There is a dialogue between work of art and spectator that displaces
the subjectivity of the experience; therefore we have met the first criterion.
What
occurs in play, according to Gadamer is presentation. Having the effect of
making something present is the second criterion of dialogue. Dialogue is
driven by the subject matter to reveal something new about it to the
interlocutors. In a crucial way GadamerÕs account of dialogue functions like
HusserlÕs phenomenological reduction: it is the means by which it becomes
possible for things to show themselves to a subject. It is likewise in the
experience of art. As Gadamer stresses in Truth and Method, art reveals truth. However, it would seem that there are
severe limitations on what a work of art can reveal. After all, a conversation
can continue beyond the original topic showing new connections and producing
genuinely new views. In an exchange
with another person, a great number of issues can arise. When we look at a work
of art, it may reveal things, but those things are limited by the subject
matter of the work. Thus, although dialogue and art reveal things to
consciousness, there would seem to be a crucial asymmetry. Gadamer objects to
that conclusion. Against the idea
that the content of aesthetic experience is limited Gadamer says,
an artwork is never
exhausted. It never becomes empty. . . . No work of art addresses us always in
the same way. The result is we must answer it differently each time we
encounter it. Other susceptibilities, other attentiveness, other opennesses in
ourselves permit that one, unique, single, and self-same unity of artistic
assertion to generate an inexhaustible multiplicity of answers.[11]
Because of the
play inherent in the experience of a work of art, it always contains the
possibility of revealing something new to us. But to be able to do that, to be
such that Ò[c]onceptual explication is never able to exhaust the content of the
poetic imageÓ,[12] requires the possibility of an alterity
to the meaning of a work which can never be reduced to simply a projection of
oneÕs conceptions. With the possibility, then, of the experience of a work of
art making something present which is both radically different and perpetually
fertile, we can dismiss the objection that there is a significant asymmetry
here between dialogue with another person and dialogue with a work of art. The
experience of art meets the second criterion for being a genuine dialogue.
Both
criteria are central to any account of dialogue, and both are fully present in
GadamerÕs account of the experience of a work of art. Certainly, therefore, it is appropriate to speak of our
experience of art as a form of dialogue. Gadamer himself writes that Ò[a]n
encounter with a great work of art has always been, I would say, like a
fruitful conversation, a question and answer or being asked and replying
obligingly, a true dialogue whereby something has emerged and remains.Ó[13] Notice both criteria are met in this quotation: an
encounter with a work of art takes the form of a conversation of question and
answer, and something emerges from the conversation.
Still,
these features do not exhaust all that occurs in dialogue with another
person. In Excitable Speech[14] Judith Butler brings out the role of the
expressive (ÒperformativeÓ) body in speech acts. She says of dialogue: ÒIf the speaker addresses his or her
body to the one addressed, then it is not merely the body of the speaker that
comes into play: it is the body of the addressee as well. Is the one speaking
merely speaking, or is the one speaking comporting her or his body toward the
other, exposing the body of the other as vulnerable to address?Ó[15]
If we are to take seriously the role of the body in constituting
dialogue, then we need to look at how the different modes of body-comportment
affect the nature of dialogue across contexts. Not only is openness to new
meanings constitutive of dialogue, so is physical openness. Both dialogue with others and dialogue
with works of art require attentiveness, orienting our body towards the
person/work, and Òtarrying.Ó But
there is more to human embodied interaction than to that with a work of
art. Gestures contribute to the
dialogue with another person in ways they do not with a work of art. Our attitudes are expressed in our
gestures, postures, and facial expressions in ways art works are necessarily
oblivious. Bodily expressions,
however, always inform a dialogue between persons. There is a richness found in
embodied interaction between persons absent from the encounter with a work of
art. First, spoken engagements are
always developed out of and are responding to the bodily engagements between
the interlocutors. Second, this embodied interaction is itself dialogical.
Notice that gestured interaction meets the criteria constitutive of
dialogue. In the gestured
communication the interplay always occurs behind full conscious awareness and
in gestured communication something is presented (perhaps, for example, the
power dynamics of the exchange through the postures of the interlocutors).[16]
Importantly, this embodied dialogue operates (often subconsciously) to
affect the outcome of the verbal dialogue and, as a result, introduces a level
of complexity to intersubjective dialogue categorically distinguishing it from
dialogue with works of art.
But
why think the difference is categorical?
Perhaps the distinction between dialogue with another person and
dialogue with works of art does not rest on a distinction among forms of
dialogue, but simply on the information available to the dialogue. In the case
of face-to-face dialogue with another person, there is a greater amount of
information exchanged; we can read their body language and be in a better
position to understand what is being said. This way of speaking—about the
exchange of information—is usually misleading, but it does get us to see
the concern. A similar objection would be that there are simply two dialogues
occurring in the case of the interpersonal interaction—a verbal dialogue
and a gestural, perhaps pre-conscious dialogue. Still, then, it is not that
something different is occurring, but rather that there is an increased level
of complexity. I donÕt believe either explanation sufficiently describes what
happens in interpersonal dialogue. Neither sufficiently appreciates the
relation between linguistic expression and the lived body. Neither accurately
represents the way linguistic expression arises out of and is always
co-implicated in bodily comportment. The embodied dialogue is not simply an
additional dialogue, or an additional source of information, but the condition
for the spoken dialogue and the way in which we exist as beings in the world.
Moreover, the meanings of the spoken dialogue arise out of and are an
expression of our bodily comportment.
The work of art doesnÕt choose to enter into dialogue, but a dialogue
with another person reveals that a decision has been made, among many other
possible actions, and thus reveals a normative dimension to the fact of
dialogue that is absent from the dialogue with a work of art. Finally, through
this choice to enter into dialogue with another person we necessarily comport
ourselves bodily in certain ways. Choosing is an embodied activity. In so
choosing, we not only communicate our intention to enter into dialogue, but we
communicate a bodily expression of what it means to enter into dialogue with
another person. There is then a bodily exchange at the base of the decision to
take up the dialogue with another person that is absent from dialogues with
works of art.[17]
So
if we agree that the dialogical body structurally affects and distinguishes
dialogue with another subject from the dialogue with a work of art, it would make
sense to ask whether Gadamer embraces such an account of the body. In a recent article, ÒBodily Experience
and the Limits of ObjectificationÓ he directly addresses some of the central
questions motivating any philosophy of the body: ÒWhat does it mean to become
aware of the body as the body and to treat it as such? . . . How is the fact of
our embodiment related to the mysterious phenomena of reflective consciousness,
which is capable of thinking out beyond all temporal and corporeal constraints
and even lose itself in the infinite?Ó[18]
GadamerÕs view there, however, does not progress much beyond the classic
distinction between ÒLeibÓ and ÒKšrperÓ—between the body as it is
experienced and lived, and the body as it is objectified. Elsewhere he will write that
HusserlÕs analyses
concerning the kinesthetic constitution of our bodily being are of exquisite
subtlety. However does not the real mystery of our bodily being consist in
this, that the actual being of the body is not an object of consciousness? OneÕs
bodily actuality is not what one notices of oneÕs body and what one senses when
one does not feel well. It rather consists in our fully being-given-over to the
ÒhereÓ, to what captivates us, lets us be awake in the actual course of
thinking—to speak with Aristotle. Thus the soul is nothing other than
this active actuality, this being at work of the body, its energeia and entelechia; and body is nothing other than the
soulÕs ÒpossibilityÓ in being awake and in thinking. What about Òthe things
themselvesÓ as regards our bodily being?
Merleau-Ponty and Aristotle saw it correctly: the body is nothing for
itself, nor corpus.[19]
Gadamer
recognizes the unusual nature of the body—that it exists for us in ways
quite different than objects in our perceptual field. Rather the body is the
condition for having a perceptual field at all and one of the most important
constituting factors structuring that perceptual field. Here Gadamer
acknowledges two claims which are essential to an account of the body sensitive
to the way the body functions across dialogical contexts. First, the body is in a unique
ontological position with respect to the subject; it is neither a mere physical
object nor purely part of the subject.
That is why he appeals to bodily experiences as examples of experiences
that Òcannot be approached through objectivization and treated as
methodological objects.Ó[20] Second, the body is that by which the
world is opened for us. It mediates the subject and the physical world. Gadamer
writes Ò[b]ecause the body presents itself as something with which we are
intimate and not like an obstacle, it is precisely what sets us free and lets
us be open for what is.Ó[21] But is this yet an account of a
dialogical body? The third feature
needed to show the affect of the body in interpersonal interactions is an
account of the dialogical nature of the body itself. In the original quotation,
Gadamer refers to Merleau-Ponty, and Merleau-PontyÕs ÒintercorporealityÓ is
clearly a dialogical account of the body. But the key fact for Gadamer is that
the body is the locus of the conditions for actuality. What he appeals to in
Merleau-Ponty is not the dialogical aspect of the body, but its role in
constitution. There is no evidence here—or elsewhere—that Gadamer
has an explicit account of a dialogical body. And without that, we shouldnÕt
expect him to recognize how dialogue structurally varies across these contexts.
Still,
in GadamerÕs theory of art we find a phenomenological distinction that is just
the kind of distinction explained by a consideration of the dialogical body in
an encounter. Gadamer speaks
differently of theater and of static works of art. Both reveal truths, but in
the context of discussing the participatory, festival nature of the theater
Gadamer gives special place to the expressiveness of gestures. Such emphasis
hints at what one would expect from a sensitivity to the role of the body
across dialogical contexts. Gadamer appeals to the festival as an event that
manifests all the features of aesthetic experience—play, community,
tarrying, and revelation of truth—but which differs from arts works by
creating an immediate and intimate unity of creation among the participants.
ÒThe genuine experience of the enduring festive character of the theater seems
to me to lie in the immediate communal experience of what we are and how things
stand with us in the vital interchange between player and onlooker.Ó[22] Here the dialogical relationship among
the theatergoers is different from the dialogical relationship to the work.
This vital interchange may be a point in GadamerÕs theory where an account of
the effects of embodied dialogue may play out.
Gadamer
expands on his distinction between festivals and plastic or written works of
art in his essay ÒZur Phþnomenology von Ritual und Sprache.Ó[23]
There Gadamer distinguishes between ÒMitsamtÓ from ÒMiteinander.Ó
Mitsamt refers
to the shared interactions of animals acting Òtogether withÓ one another. We
can see this as applying to George Herbert MeadÕs example of the conversation
of gestures between dogs. Miteinander is a Òsharing togetherÓ, a Òwith-one-anotherÓ reserved for
the possibility of language use.
Only humans take up their world in a consciously articulate way and
share that world with the aim of understanding. Gadamer will even claim that
ÒThe basis for all mutual understandings [is] in living with one another [Miteinanderleben]Ó[24] which implicitly rules out applying the
term ÒunderstandingÓ to non-linguistic exchanges. Yet according to Gadamer in
this later work, all festivals (here subsumed under the more general term
ÒritualÓ) generate a feeling of oneness and are shared activities that unite
communities. They only do so at
the level of Mitsamt,
not Miteinander.[25]
Gadamer is not establishing a dichotomy between non-linguistic, physical
exchanges and linguistic communication aimed at understanding; rather he is
reaffirming the established claim that the telos of language is dialogue. In this context, however, he is
connecting it with forms of interaction which are meaningful, but which
themselves do not manifest the perfection of language. Richard Palmer is right
to say that
GadamerÕs basic
position has not changed. It has only taken a step back phenomenologically in
order to situate the problem of language not in linguisticality as such but Òin
the lifeworld where actions as well as speaking are found.Ó There Gadamer sheds
light on the phenomenology of ritual and marks the borderline and the contrasts
between language used in ritual and language used in conversation.[26]
The issue Gadamer
is addressing here is the one we emphasized earlier about the essential
interconnectedness between the pre-linguistic, embodied dialogical interactions
and the linguistic communication that arises out of them. But accompanying that
realization comes the realization that there is a distinctive form of bodily,
dialogical interaction.
So
if one wants to claim dialogueÕs role in solving a number of philosophical
problems, one must be careful to lay out the differences across those forms of
dialogue. The role of the body in dialogue constitutes an important difference;
we have seen how it distinguishes dialogue with another person form dialogue
with a work of art. We have also seen that Gadamer, though not explicit about
the dialogical body has features in his theory which are not only merely
consistent with such an elaboration of the body, but may in the end benefit
from making the role of the body in dialogue explicit.
David
Vessey
Beloit
College
[1] The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Library of Living Philosophers Vol. XXIV (Chicago: Open Court, 1997), 22.
[2] The Enigma of Health (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 167.
[3] The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 274.
[4] The Enigma of Health, 166.
[5] Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 23.
[6] Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 358. Hereafter TM.
[7] The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 36.
[8] TM, 377.
[9] TM, 106.
[10] The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 43-44.
[11] The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 44.
[12] The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 39. Consider also on page 43 of the same work, Òthe work of art distinguishes itself in that one never completely understands it. That is to say, when one approaches it questioningly, one never obtains a final answer that one now Ôknows.Õ Nor does one take from it relevant information and that takes care of that! One cannot fully harvest the information that resides in an artwork.Ó
[13] ÒPhilosophy and LiteratureÓ in Man and World, 18:1985, 250.
[14] Berkeley: Univ. California Press, 1997.
[15] Excitable Speech, 12-13.
[16] George Herbert Mead develops his influential theory of intersubjectivity on this point: gestures form a genuine dialogue. He believes that once spoken and written communication are added to the dialogue, the structure of the exchange changes, but never at the cost of eliminating the continuing gestural conversation.
[17] Notice there are more issues here to be parsed out, for example, the intricate differences between actual face-to-face dialogues, and dialogues over the phone or through the mail.
[18] The Enigma of Health (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 72.
[19] pp. 106-7, ÒPhenomenology, Hermeneutics, and MetaphysicsÓ Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, (25, no. 2 (May 1994)), 104-110.
[20] Praise of Theory (New Haven: Yale UP, 1998), 29. Interestingly for his (underdeveloped) account of intersubjectivity, he continues: ÒSimilarly, we have seen that the individual's immersion in the various kinds of human and social intimacy does more than merely limit the extent to which we can be reduced to objective observers. It is precisely what teaches us, in our recognition of the other, to recognize reality, and so lets us also acknowledge the reality of far-off times and foreign peoples."
[21] Praise of Theory, 30.
[22] The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays, 65.
[23] Gesammelte Werke, Band 8 (TŸbingen: Mohr, 1993), 400-440. This has recently been translated by Lawrence Schmidt and Monika Reuss as ÒTowards a Phenomenology of Ritual and LanguageÓ and published in Language and Linguisticality in GadamerÕs Hermeneutics, ed. Lawrence Schmidt (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000) pp. 19-50. All quotes will be referenced to that work.
[24] ÒTowards a Phenomenology of Ritual and LanguageÓ, p. 29. Merleau-Ponty will say something similar. ÒThere is one particular cultural object which is destined to play a crucial role in the perception of other people: language. In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are interwoven into a single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. We have here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of behavior in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in a consummate reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a common world.Ó (Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), 354)
[25] This division may strike us as too extreme—the pre-linguistic rituals, and the linguistic communication—and indeed it is more simplistic than Gadamer has in mind. Gadamer acknowledges that speaking occurs during ritual, however language is not performing there according to its essence. Picking up on a much repeated theme that language only has its real being in dialogue, Gadamer claims that Òthe with-one-another [das Miteinander], on the other hand, develops in the true life of language, and that especially in conversationsÓ (ÒTowards a Phenomenology of Ritual and LanguageÓ, 32).